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2Agrarian Contracts
Labor and land are the most important resources in cocoa production. Chapter
2 discusses the various agrarian contracts made by Ghanaian cocoa farmers to
acquire labor and land. In Section I a number of labor arrangements and
agrarian contracts in cocoa production are described. The aim here is twofold.
First, it is to provide information on labor deployment strategies of and means
of acquiring land by farmers, which helps in understanding the variety of
agrarian contracts and institutions in Ghana. Second, it highlights the charac-
teristics of contracts that are very different from those of share contracts
described in the next section. Section II focuses on a detailed analysis of the
share contracts that are used extensively in cocoa production. This analysis
demonstrates that these share contracts have a social significance in that they
take a variety of forms to suit the particular circumstances of both landlords
and tenants and, at the same time, they can be adapted in line with changes in
individual life cycles and socioeconomic conditions. The section also dis-
cusses why, in Ghanaian cocoa production, share contracts dominate and
fixed-wage or fixed-rent contracts are rarely found.
I. Labor Arrangements and Agrarian Contracts
1. Labor Arrangements
The types of labor used in cocoa farming can be classified into four catego-
ries: family labor, hired labor, communal labor, and labor exchange groups
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(nnoboa). Among these four types, family labor, especially that of spouses
and offspring, constitutes the most important source of farm labor. Matrilineal
kin members such as sisters’ offspring (wofase) are a less important source of
labor. While these kin members may have rights associated with traditional
matrilineal inheritance, they make little contribution to the actual farm work.
This situation appears to be closely associated with the frequent practice of
land transfer from father to son or from husband to wife in the case of gifting
and inheritance of land rights. Both male and female labor is used in all farm
tasks, but the most strength-demanding tasks, such as initial clearing and tree-
felling, tend to be done by males; female farmers are likely to use their
husbands’ labor for these tasks, while husbands use their own. Unmarried
young farmers who have no access to their spouses’ or parents’ labor appear to
use their own labor for most farm tasks.
The types of hired labor used in the study villages are daily wage labor,
task-contracted labor, and annual labor. Daily wage labor and task-contracted
labor are frequently used for labor- and strength-demanding tasks such as
preparing new farms and weeding. Although payment for task-contracted
labor is subject to negotiation between farm owners and laborers, standard
charges according to an indigenous measurement called ahama (rope) usually
exist. Daily wage labor is used for all types of farm work; the wages vary
depending on the type of work. Annual laborers are paid annually, and the
employer provides shelter, farming tools, clothes, and medical care for the
laborers. Because employers provide daily necessities, arrangements for an-
nual labor contracts provide a favorable condition for new migrant laborers
who have no capital or relatives in the village. Amounts paid to annual labor-
ers, however, are far less than those paid to laborers in other types of labor
contracts. Therefore annual labor contracts rarely last more than a few years;
most laborers enter other labor arrangements in which they are better paid.
Among the three villages surveyed, only four cases of annual labor contracts
were identified. All the cases were in Nagore, with none in the other two
villages. According to the villagers, however, annual labor contracts were also
practiced in the nearby villages of Bepoase and Gyaha.
Communal labor is a system of labor exchange in which farmers work on
other farms on an ad hoc basis. The communal labor used in cocoa farming is
highly task-specific. In most cases it is used for the tasks of breaking cocoa
pods and carrying fermented cocoa to drying places. The number of partici-
pants varies (approximately from five to thirty) depending on the amount of
cocoa harvested on the farm. The time required for each task is less than a day.
No payment is provided to the participants, but food, and sometimes drink, is
served after the work.
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In contrast to the loosely organized communal labor, the structure of labor
exchange groups, nnoboa, is tight. The groups have clear memberships, usu-
ally two to five people, and labor is exchanged on a rotating basis. The labor is
used for all types of farm work, but most commonly for weeding. Although no
payment is made for the labor, food is often served by the farm owner. Gender
and age play important roles in the structure of nnoboa groups. There is a
strong tendency for men and women to form separate nnoboa groups. This is
probably because physical strength is different between male and female, and
the labor exchange becomes unequal if the members are gender-mixed. In
addition, younger people appear to be more likely than their older counter-
parts to form nnoboa groups (Table 2-1). This perhaps stems from the fact that
younger farmers have both less capital to use hired labor and less access to
family labor, and thus supplement these with the labor of nnoboa groups.
The primary function of nnoboa is to overcome labor shortages on one’s
own farm through an exchange of labor. Accordingly, the nnoboa functions as
a mutual support system among farmers who cannot afford hired labor. On the
other hand, however, a member of a nnoboa group may not use the labor
available through the group on his own farms but only on other villagers’
farms, for a monetary return. In this situation, the labor provided by group
TABLE  2-1
DISTRIBUTION OF NNOBOA MEMBERS BY AGE AND SEX
(No. of persons)
Age
Total
–29 30–39 40–49 50–
Bepoase
Male 12 3 1 1 17
Female 0 0 0 0 0
Total 12 3 1 1 17
Nagore
Male 15 13 6 8 42
Female 5 6 3 1 15
Total 20 19 9 9 57
Gyaha
Male 18 15 10 6 49
Female 4 2 0 0 6
Total 22 17 10 6 55
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14 CHAPTER 2
members is remunerated in cash. Consequently, nnoboa not only fulfils its
primary function of acquiring labor free of charge through a mutual labor
exchange, but also the additional function of securing opportunities to acquire
monetary income through the use of the group’s labor force. As Table 2-2
shows, some of the nnoboa groups in all the villages work to earn wages in
this way.
2. Agrarian Contracts for Land
Farmers in the three surveyed villages engage in crop production by acquir-
ing usufruct right of land through various agrarian contracts (Tables 2-3 through
2-5). The most frequently used is the share contract for cocoa production. As
the share contract for cocoa production will be analyzed in detail in the next
section, the following discussion will focus on other types of contract.
(1) Share Contracts for Food Crops
In share contracts for the production of food crops, tenants produce food
crops by using the landlords’ land, and share the production with the landlords
in agreed proportions. The sharing arrangement is usually abusa (division into
three) or abunu (division into two), depending on the individual contracts. In
this type of contract, the landlords do not specify the crops to be produced.
This decision is left to the tenant’s discretion. However, tenants are not per-
mitted to plant perennial crops such as cocoa, oil palm, and citrus. Share
contracts for food crops are concluded between tenants and landlords who
reside in the same or neighboring villages, and rarely with absentee landlords.
This is because it is too expensive for landlords living some distance away to
visit the farms and collect the products.
The method of sharing differs according to the crop. Maize is shared after
harvesting. In the case of cassava and cocoyam, the farms are partitioned into
set areas and both landlords and tenants collect their own crops when these are
ready for harvesting. The contracts automatically terminate with the harvest-
TABLE  2-2
PERCENTAGES OF NNOBOA GROUPS WITH A WAGE-EARNING FUNCTION
Village Total Number of Nnoboa Percentages of GroupsGroups with a Wage-Earning Function
Bepoase 7 29
Nagore 26 58
Gyaha 26 23
Total 59 39
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ing of the crops. The contract term, therefore, is usually less than two years.
The contract may be renewed, covering different sites owned by the same
landlord.
(2) Usufruct Rights by Planting Cocoa Seedlings for Landlords
Some contracts specify usufruct rights for the production of food crops on
the condition that cocoa seedlings are planted for the benefit of the landlords.
These contracts entitle tenants to engage in food crop production and to retain
all the harvested products, but require them to plant cocoa for their landlords
on the farms being developed. In the second year, when the cocoa trees have
grown and the harvesting of food crops ends, the cocoa farms are returned to
TABLE  2-3
TYPES AND SOURCES OF USUFRUCT RIGHTS IN BEPOASE
Type Total No. Sex No. Sources and No. of Contracts
Male 23 Unrelated 12; father’s brother 3; mother’s
sister 2; wife, father, 1 each; other 4
Female 5 Unrelated 3, father 1, husband’s father’sbrother 1
Male 19
Unrelated 12; father 3; maternal grand-
mother, wife, wife’s father, unknown, 1
each
Female 1 Mother 1
Male 0
Female 0
Male 4 Father’s brother, maternal grandmother,
unrelated, wife’s father, 1 each
Female 6 Unrelated 1, husband 1, unknown 4
Male 1 Unrelated 1
Female 0
Male 26
Unrelated 10; father 6; paternal grandfather
2; mother, maternal grandmother, 1 each;
other relative 2; unknown 4
Female 12 Husband 7, husband’s relative 3, mother2
Male 73 Unrelated 36, father 4, father’s brother 4,
other 29
Female 24 Husband 8, unrelated 4, mother 3, husband’s
relative 4, other 5
Usufruct rights by
planting cocoa 10
seedlings for landlord
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Share contract for peren-
nial crops except cocoa 1
Share contract for
food crops 0
Free use of land 38
Total 97
Yemayenkye 28
Nhwesoo 20
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the landlords and the tenants have no right to the cocoa farms. If land is
readily available, tenants may continue to produce food crops by gradually
moving the production sites every year. This type of contract is of benefit to
both the tenant and the landlord, with the tenant obtaining the usufruct right
for food crop production without paying rent, and the landlord having a cocoa
farm developed without working on the farm.
(3) Free Use of Land for Production of Food Crops
In a good many cases, land is borrowed free of charge from a husband,
wife, relative, or close friend who holds unused land, to produce food crops.
Public employees, such as teachers or agricultural extension officers, often
TABLE  2-4
TYPES AND SOURCES OF USUFRUCT RIGHTS IN NAGORE
Type Total No. Sex No. Sources and No. of Contracts
Male 40 Unrelated 38, wife’s relative 2
Female 12
Unrelated 6;  father’s sister 2;  father,
husband’s sister, maternal uncle, un-
known person, 1 each
Male 42
Unrelated 27; wife’s relative 3; father 5;
mother, maternal grandfather, 2 each;
wife, nephew, father’s brother, 1 each
Female 1 Mother 1
Male 1 Unrelated 1
Female 0
Male 18 Unrelated 11; mother 3; unrelated 2; father,
maternal uncle, 1 each
Female 21
Unrelated 8;  mother 3;  maternal uncle,
maternal grandmother, father, father’s
nephew, husband, 1 each;  husband’s
relative 3; other 2
Male 0
Female 0
Male 11 Unrelated 3, father 3, mother 2, other 3
Female 5 Husband 3, father 1, maternal uncle 1
Male 112 Unrelated 80, father 9, mother 7, other 16
Female 39 Unrelated 14, husband 4, mother 4, father3, maternal uncle 3, other 11
Usufruct rights by
planting cocoa 39
seedlings for landlord
Share contract for peren-
nial crops except cocoa 0
Share contract for
food crops 1
Free use of land 16
Total 151
Yemayenkye 52
Nhwesoo 43
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TABLE  2-5
TYPES AND SOURCES OF USUFRUCT RIGHTS IN GYAHA
Type Total No. Sex No. Sources and No. of Contracts
Male 107 Unrelated 84, wife’s father 3, father 2, ma-ternal uncle 2, other 16
Female 24
Unrelated 19; mother, maternal uncle,
husband’s brother, father’s sister’s child,
paternal uncle, 1 each
Male 6 Father 5, brother 1
Female 28 Husband 24; father 2; brother, maternalgrandmother, 1 each
Male 24
Unrelated 19; maternal uncle 2; father,
wife’s mother’s maternal uncle, mater-
nal aunt’s son, 1 each
Female 2 Unrelated 2
Male 18 Unrelated 18
Female 17
Unrelated 14; husband’s maternal uncle,
mother’s maternal uncle, sister’s daugh-
ter’s husband, 1 each
Male 6 Unrelated 6
Female 9
Unrelated 4; husband, husband’s mother,
husband’s brother, father, paternal grand-
father’s grandson, 1 each
Male 11 Unrelated 9; father’s sister’s child, pater-
nal grandfather’s brother, 1 each
Female 1 Unrelated 1
Male 11 Father 6, other relative 4, maternal uncle1
Female 21 Husband 15, maternal uncle 2, father 2,husband’s mother 1, other relative 1
Male 4 Okumaninghene 2, Kyebihene 1, unknown1
Female 4 Okumaninghene 3, Abenasehene 1
Male 187 Unrelated 136, father 14, maternal uncle 5,
other 32
Female 106 Unrelated 40, husband 40, father 5, mater-
nal uncle 3, other 18
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Yemayenkye land
contracted by
relatives
34
Nhwesoo 26
Usufruct rights by
planting cocoa 15
seedlings for landlord
Agofi 8
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rent land for food production, free of charge, through arrangements with
village heads. In all these cases, perennial crops are not allowed to be planted,
and the land must be returned to the landlord after a certain period of time.
In the most common examples, a husband may allow his wife to use his
land for food crop production. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the degree of
autonomy wives can enjoy on the husbands’ land varies from case to case. It is
often the case that wives plant cocoa on the husbands’ land in the expectation
that the land will be gifted to them by their husbands in the future.
(4) Agofi
In Gyaha there is a system known as agofi, whereby a group of villagers
rents land collectively from the traditional chief, and pays an annually pre-
scribed amount of rent to the chief. The village head allocates and collects the
rent and pays it to the chief as the group’s representative. The village head also
decides which part of the land is allocated to whom, after hearing from the
villagers. The land users can grow whatever crops they like, including peren-
nial crops such as cocoa. When they no longer need the land (or when they
cannot pay their share of rent), the land is allocated to other applicants.
More than one relative may use land allocated under agofi, but only if a
representative pays the rent in a lump sum. The usufruct right secured under
the agofi can be inherited. Cocoa farms can be developed on the land, and the
land can be leased out. However, even in the case of a sublease, the original
land user must pay the rent to the chief through the village head.
II. Share Contracts
1. Two Types of Share Contracts
Share contracts are widely practiced in cocoa farming in all three villages
studied. Most literature on share contracts in Ghana treats them under the
single category of abusa (division into three).1 In the study locations, how-
ever, two distinct types of share contracts are found and the contents of the
two are very different (Table 2-6). The two types are nhwesoo (meaning “care-
taking”) and yemayenkye (“do and let’s share/divide”).2 This section describes
the two types of share contracts in detail, and then discusses the reasons for
the preference for these types of contract over fixed-rent contracts and fixed-
wage contracts.
(1) Nhwesoo
In the nhwesoo type of share contracts, tenants manage already-established
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cocoa farms and in return get a share of the profit derived from the cocoa
harvest (Case 2-1 at the end of this chapter). Tenants are responsible for the
weeding, spraying, and harvesting of cocoa. If the tenants employ farm labor-
ers for these tasks, it is the tenants’ responsibility to pay for the laborers. If the
farm owner asks the tenant to do farm tasks other than the aforementioned
ones (such as establishing new farms), the tenant is remunerated for the
additional work. Sharing arrangements of the profit between farm owners and
tenants are usually abusa, in which the tenants take one-third. When the
contracting parties are related (for example, a father and his son, or a wife and
her husband), the sharing arrangements are often abunu (division into two).
There is no fixed pattern of cost sharing of farm inputs between farm owners
and tenants.
The majority of farm owners in nhwesoo contracts are own-account farm-
ers and reside in or near the study villages. If this is the case, farm owners
make most of the decisions on farm management (for example, when to weed
and spray insecticides), and the tenants’ work is closely supervised. Farm
owners also make decisions on the selling of cocoa (the selection of buying
centers and means of payment—cash or check). The tenants do not usually
have their own “farmer books,” in which records of cocoa sales are kept. The
small proportion of management decisions on the tenants’ side makes nhwesoo
little distinguishable from the permanent labor contract in which a worker is
remunerated with a share of the output (Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami 1992, p.
1966).
For nhwesoo, no written agreement of the contract is prepared. The contract
ceases when either party so desires or the tenant dies, and the usufruct right of
land is not inherited by the deceased’s relatives. The majority of nhwesoo
contracts at the time of the survey lasted for one to six years, but some (21 per
cent) of the contracts lasted more than ten years (Table 2-7).
TABLE  2-6
PERCENTAGES OF SHARE CONTRACT TENANTS
Village
Nhwesoo Yemayenkye
No. of Cases % No. of Cases %
Bepoase (N = 87) 17 20 17 20
Nagore (N = 152) 39 26 44 29
Gyaha (N = 235) 23 10 127 54a
Total (N = 474) 79 17 188  40
Note: N = number of farmers interviewed.
a Including the cases of subcontracts for part of the land contracted by relatives.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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(2) Yemayenkye
In the second type of share contracts, yemayenkye, tenants are responsible
for all the farm tasks (clearing land, establishing cocoa farms, weeding, spray-
ing, and harvesting), and in return receive a half share of the cocoa harvest
(Case 2-2). A critical difference between nhwesoo and yemayenkye is that in
nhwesoo a landlord establishes cocoa farms either with his/her own labor or
by employing hired laborers before handing over the established farms to
tenants, while in yemayenkye a tenant establishes cocoa farms with his/her
own labor and expense. This means that the tenant in nhwesoo obtains a share
of the cocoa harvest from the first year of the contract, while the tenant in
yemayenkye has to wait for several years (until trees start bearing fruit) before
obtaining a share of the cocoa harvest. In yemayenkye the landlords often give
instructions on which variety of cocoa to be planted and how often the farm
should be sprayed. However, other decisions on farm management are left to
the tenants. In addition, most tenants in yemayenkye have their own “farmer
books” and make their own decisions on sales of cocoa. Costs of farm inputs,
including labor costs, are borne by the tenants, but in some cases the landlords
bear the cost of spraying. The contracting parties often prepare written agree-
ments of the contracts.
TABLE  2-7
DURATION OF NHWESOO CONTRACTS
(No. of contract farms)
Village
Number of Years
1 2 3 4 5 6
Bepoase 3 3 1 4 4 3
Nagore 10 9 13 6 7 10
Gyaha 6 8 2 11 6 2
Total 19 20 16 21 17 15
Village
Number of Years
7 8 9 10 or Over Unknown Total
Bepoase 1 0 0 11 0 30
Nagore 1 2 0 13 2 73
Gyaha 0 1 1 6 0 43
Total 2 3 1 30 2 146
Note: When two tenants with different years of service work jointly on the same farm,
the longer years are adopted in the table.
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Two important variations of yemayenkye exist concerning what is to be
shared between landlords and tenants. The first variation is that, after the
tenant establishes the cocoa farm, the cocoa trees on the farm, rather than the
cocoa harvest, are divided into two equal parts, and each part is independently
managed by the landlord and the tenant (Case 2-3). The second variation is
that, from the very beginning of the contract or during the course of establish-
ing the farm, the contracting parties agree to share the land when the establish-
ment of the farm is completed and the cocoa trees mature (Case 2-4). The
difference between the two variations is that in the first the land will be
returned to the original landlord if all the trees die or the tenant abandons the
farm, while in the second variation, once the land is divided, the original
landlord has no right to reclaim the part of the land transferred to the tenant. In
both cases, landlords and tenants share the cocoa harvest in an agreed propor-
tion until the trees or the lands are divided.
The land-dividing yemayenkye mentioned above is less popular in Gyaha
than in Bepoase and Nagore. This is probably because of the different socio-
economic situations of the three villages. Bepoase and Nagore are located in a
relatively new cocoa-growing area in which the first migrants settled in the
1940s and 1950s. On the other hand, Gyaha is located in the oldest cocoa-
growing area where migrants started producing cocoa at the beginning of the
twentieth century. Given the longer history of cocoa production and the result-
ant division of land among kin members through inheritance and gift over
generations, the individual landholdings are smaller and the uncultivated land
scarcer in Gyaha than in other two villages. This makes the landlords in
Gyaha reluctant to alienate the land through land-dividing yemayenkye.
Sharing arrangements under yemayenkye are not constant and may vary
regionally or over time. In Gyaha, some of the yemayenkye contracts con-
cluded in early years were triplet division (abusa) in which tenants take two
parts. According to some farmers in Gyaha who have lived in the village for a
long time, triplet division used to be the normal practice, but new landlords in
later years adopted the equal sharing method (abunu), and this format is now
the norm. Field (1948, pp. 75–76) reports that in Abenase (a town near Gyaha)
the sharing arrangements between landlords and tenants were triplet division
in which tenants took two parts. Ollennu (1962, pp. 79–83) also reports that
when a tenant establishes a cocoa farm his share is two-thirds, while on an
already-established farm he obtains a half share. These accounts seem to
indicate that sharing arrangements have been shifting during the past forty
years or so in favor of the landlords. This might be a result of increasing
scarcity of land and the resultant stronger bargaining power on the landlords’
side (Amanor 2000, p. 28).
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In yemayenkye, it is often the case that the contents of the contract are not
clearly agreed upon at the outset by landlords and tenants. In some cases the
landlord simply orders the tenant to start establishing the farm, and decisions
on what is to be shared (harvests, trees, or land) and when are left to future
negotiations. As a result, there are some cases in which landlords and tenants
have different understandings of the outcome of the contracts (Case 2-5). This
ambiguity has two implications. One is that it may increase the possibility of
future disputes between the contracting parties. Another is that it gives both
landlords and tenants some degree of flexibility, allowing them to modify in
their own favor the contents of the yemayenkye contract. For example, an
absentee landlord who lacks information on the ability of a tenant may want to
assess the quality of the tenant’s work before making final arrangements, thus
avoiding “adverse selection.” A tenant, on the other hand, may want to post-
pone the final decision until he establishes the cocoa farm, because an al-
ready-established farm gives the tenant a degree of security of usufruct right
on the land. The ambiguity in the outcome of yemayenkye thus constitutes
both uncertainty and flexibility.
When a tenant acquires a contractual usufruct right and engages in crop
production, an important indicator for the extent of the land right is whether
perennial crops can be planted. When a tenant plants perennial crops such as
cocoa, as is the case with a yemayenkye contract, it means that the tenant
establishes a vested interest on the land that lasts for many years. Accordingly,
the fact that a tenant with a usufruct right has been permitted by a landlord to
plant perennial crops implies that the usufruct right can remain valid for a
long period. Therefore, in a yemayenkye contract that presupposes cocoa
planting, and in the aforementioned agofi contract that permits the planting of
tree crops, the tenant has a relatively secure land right. On the other hand,
when the usufruct right is limited to the production of food crops that can be
harvested in a year or two (as in the cases of Section I, 2, (1)–(3)), the use of
land for long periods is not guaranteed, and the land rights of the tenants are
relatively limited.
Tables 2-8 and 2-9 present the numbers of tenants and landlords in the
study villages. Table 2-10 shows the number of landlords using share contract
tenants in the three villages.
2. Characteristics of the Two Share Contracts
(1) Points Common to Nhwesoo and Yemayenkye
An important incentive for tenants to enter nhwesoo or yemayenkye is that
they can obtain usufruct rights of land to grow food crops. In both contracts
landlords specify the type of farm (cocoa) to be managed or established. If
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TABLE  2-8
NUMBER OF TENANTS CONTRACTED BY A LANDLORD
(No. of cases)
Village
Number of Tenants
Total
1 2 3 4 or Over
Bepoase 9 2 0 1 12
Nagore 21 8 2 1 32
Gyaha 12 8 2 2 24
Total 42 18 4 4 68
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TABLE  2-9
NUMBER OF LANDLORDS A TENANT WORKS FOR
(No. of cases)
Village
Number of Landlords
Total
1 2 3 4 or Over
Bepoase 25 3 0 0 28
Nagore 45 19 3 0 67
Gyaha 61 31 6 4 102
Total 131 53 9 4 197
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TABLE  2-10
PERCENTAGES OF LANDLORDS USING SHARE CONTRACT TENANTS
Village
Nhwesoo Yemayenkye
No. of Cases % No. of Cases %
Bepoase (N = 87) 10 12 4 5
Nagore (N = 152) 31 20 1 1
Gyaha (N = 235) 16 7 9 4
Total (N = 474) 57 12 14  3
Note: N = number of farmers interviewed.
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tenants comply with this agreement, they are entitled to grow food crops at
their own disposal on the same land. In nhwesoo, the tenant is allowed to use
a part of the farm owner’s land (usually a part adjoining the cocoa farm
managed by the tenant) to grow food crops. In yemayenkye, the tenant enjoys
the freedom to consume and sell food crops produced in the course of estab-
lishing the cocoa farm. Sharing obligations are usually restricted to those
related to cocoa, and tenants enjoy a high degree of freedom in food produc-
24 CHAPTER 2
tion and its use. Such rights to food production make land-demanding villag-
ers more inclined to enter share contracts than other agrarian contracts.
In Ghanaian share contracts, landlord and tenant are not clearly differenti-
ated and cannot be regarded as distinct “classes.” Some landholding farmers
lease out land for share contracts while others lease in. Still others simulta-
neously lease out parts of their land, cultivate parts of it by themselves, and
lease in land from others (Case 2-6). It is clear that those who lease in land
under share contracts do not form a distinct class of landless tenants. Further-
more, as will be discussed below, tenants who are currently landless may
become landholding farmers in the future through land-dividing yemayenkye.
Landlord and tenant are therefore neither categorically distinct nor unchange-
able over time. In addition, landlords and landless tenants are not necessarily
identical to rich and poor, respectively. In Bepoase I encountered one landless
tenant who manages large cocoa farms under nhwesoo and yemayenkye from
which he harvests over a ton of cocoa. When “wealth ranking” of the villagers
(Grandin 1988) was conducted, he was classified as one of the richest in the
village. On the other hand, there are some widowed elderly female “land-
lords” who inherited small plots of cocoa farms from their deceased hus-
bands. Due to their physical weakness and lack of labor in their households,
they often have no choice but to enter nhwesoo to obtain necessary labor. Thus
for such old women, “to be labourless is as much a disadvantage in
production . . . as to be landless” (Robertson 1980, p. 420).
(2) Some Distinctive Features of Yemayenkye Contracts
In yemayenkye there are a number of distinctive features that provide incen-
tives to tenants. The first is that the tenant’s usufruct right of land is stable.
Once the cocoa farm is established, the tenant can continue farming on the
land for life, as can descendants of the original tenant. Ownership of the farm
remains in the hands of the landlord until he agrees to divide the land with the
tenant. However, according to the written agreements possessed by several
farmers, the contract cannot be canceled by the landlord unless any of the
following applies: (a) when all the planted cocoa trees have withered; (b)
when the tenant leaves the land and abandons the cocoa farm; (c) when the
tenant steals the cocoa harvest; and (d) when the tenant performs witchcraft.
With the exception of these extraordinary cases, the tenant is guaranteed
retention of the usufruct right to continue cultivation of the same land over a
long period.
Another relevant feature of yemayenkye is the inheritability of the
contractually accorded usufruct right. Unlike the nhwesoo arrangement, the
yemayenkye contract allows the tenant’s wife, children or relatives to take
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over the contract and to continue farming on the same land, even when the
original tenant dies (Case 2-7). If a landlord agrees, a tenant, while alive, can
transfer the usufruct right to his wife or children. These transferred usufruct
rights are often put in a written agreement signed by the landlord, the tenant,
and their kin members. Because of the inheritable nature of usufruct right
under yemayenkye, many farmers refer to cocoa farms under this contract as
inheritable property (agyapade). The stable and inheritable nature of usufruct
right under yemayenkye is one reason that farmers prefer this contract to
nhwesoo.
The fact that the tenant’s usufruct right granted under yemayenkye is stable
and inheritable seems to influence the relationship between the change in
relative prices of agricultural products and the farmers’ crop selection behav-
ior. Under a yemayenkye contract, the tenant’s usufruct right is guaranteed and
the inheritance right is ensured as long as a cocoa farm is well managed.
However, when all the cocoa trees wither, or when the tenant fails to manage
the farm, the tenant will lose his usufruct right. Accordingly, in order to retain
the usufruct right to the land, a tenant cannot give up a cocoa farm or change
to other crops at his discretion, even if the relative price of cocoa falls and the
production of other crops becomes more profitable. Because maintaining
cocoa farms is an important means of strengthening and securing tenants’ land
rights, a fall in the real producer price of cocoa, as happened in the 1970s and
the early 1980s in Ghana, might have less effect on production behavior than
is usually assumed.
Still another feature distinctive to yemayenkye is that it provides an oppor-
tunity for landless farmers to become landholding farmers. Either at the outset
of the contract or after some long-term negotiations, the tenants may reach
agreement with the landlord to share the land. The process of land transfer
from landlord to tenant in this arrangement is slow, and most tenants spend
five to twenty years obtaining the land. However, tenants need little capital in
this process. What is required is continuous labor input by the tenant into the
cocoa farm. In addition, tenants have access to means of subsistence until the
contracting parties finally divide the land: while establishing new farms ten-
ants are entitled to harvest food crops; when cocoa trees are mature, they can
obtain a share of the cocoa harvest.
Thus, yemayenkye differs from the ordinary share contract which only
defines the arrangement for sharing the harvest: it guarantees the stable and
inheritable usufruct right of the tenant as long as the cocoa trees remain
viable. At the same time, yemayenkye provides the tenant with an opportunity
to become a landholding farmer through division of the landholding right with
a landlord.
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(3) Intensity of Landlord Supervision of Tenants and Underreporting of
Total Harvest
Another important difference between nhwesoo and yemayenkye contracts
is the intensity of landlord supervision of tenants. Many nhwesoo landlords
are own-account farmers who live in or near the village. This enables the
landlords to strictly supervise the work of their tenants and to make most of
the decisions on farm work. The tenant’s decision-making rights are limited,
and the tenant is thus more like a laborer remunerated with a share of the
output. On the other hand, most landlords under yemayenkye are absentee
landlords who come only during the harvest season to supervise the tenants
and to collect their shares. As a result, landlord supervision of tenants in
everyday farm work is weak, and there is large leeway for tenants to underre-
port the total harvest. In addition, because it is the tenants who establish the
farm and make decisions on everyday farm management, while most land-
lords reside far away and are not experienced farmers, the landlords have
much less information than the tenants on farm conditions and total harvest.
The difficulty of contract enforcement and the information asymmetry be-
tween the contracting parties concerning farm conditions are thus two main
factors that lead to the widely practiced underreporting of the total harvest.
Because of the wide practice of underreporting, yemayenkye constitutes a
unique combination of production incentive and risk sharing that is some-
where between the share contract and the fixed-rent tenancy contract. Because
a landlord does not have accurate information on the total harvest, a tenant can
reduce the landlord’s share below the level agreed in the contract. This means
that the production incentive to the tenant may be stronger than that in the
share contract because, after the tenant gives the landlord an amount that
satisfies the landlord, the tenant keeps all the extra output that any additional
inputs on his/her part may yield. This incentive structure is similar to that of
fixed-rent tenancy. On the other hand, the risk sharing inherent under the share
contract remains the same under yemayenkye: the tenant may reduce the
amount paid to the landlord in a year of bad harvest. Therefore yemayenkye,
together with the wide practice of underreporting, provides not only a produc-
tion incentive higher than the ordinary share contract without underreporting
but also an arrangement to share the risk.
(4) Reputation, Kin, and Marital Relations
Contract-breaching behavior, such as tenant underreporting of the harvest,
can be reduced in a community where villagers are long-term settlers and
people know one another well, and where information about contract-breach-
ing is easily transmitted to other villagers. This is because a person’s reputa-
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tion in such a community affects his future economic opportunities, thus
reducing the incentive to breach the contract (Hayami and Otsuka 1993, pp.
56–58). In the three villages studied, however, reputation seems to play a less
significant role in reducing the incentive to underreport the harvest. Three
factors may explain the situation. First, all the study villages are migrant
communities, the composition of village population is multiethnic, and the
population is highly mobile.3 In such a situation village structures are not
tight, and reputation plays only a limited role in reducing contract-breaching.
Second, information about the total harvest of cocoa can easily be restricted to
the tenant. As a result villagers cannot accurately know the total cocoa harvest
and the extent of contract-breaching by the tenant. Third, as most landlords
are absentees and have little interaction with villagers, there is no incentive for
villagers to report breaching behavior to the landlords.
As can be seen in Table 2-11, a number of share contracts are made between
relatives or between husbands and wives. A majority of the tenancy contracts
are made between unrelated persons, but there are still a good many tenancy
contracts concluded between kin members or spouses. For instance, a father
makes his son develop a cocoa farm on the assumption that the son will be
given the farm in the future. In such cases, nhwesoo and yemayenkye con-
cluded between relatives or spouses may be better understood as a prelimi-
nary step toward inheritance of the farm or land than merely as an economic
contract4 (Robertson 1982, p. 468).
TABLE  2-11
RATIO OF SHARE CONTRACTS WITH RELATIVES OR SPOUSES
N No. of Cases %
Bepoase
Nhwesoo 24 7 29
Yemayenkye 21 8 38
Total 45 15 33
Nagore
Nhwesoo 78 29 37
Yemayenkye 52 8 15
Total 130 37 28
Gyaha
Nhwesoo 46 8 17
Yemayenkye 162 25 15
Total 208 33 16
Note: N = number of farmers interviewed.
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(5) Share Contracts and Villagers’ Life Cycles
Nhwesoo and yemayenkye are closely linked with a villager’s life cycle, in
that the two types of share contracts provide an important step in a farmer’s
career to acquire a more direct interest in land (Robertson 1982). A newly
arrived migrant who has no capital or relatives, for example, may first enter
the annual labor contract in which daily necessities are provided by his em-
ployer. While he serves as an annual laborer, his employer may hand over
cocoa farms to the laborer as nhwesoo, or the laborer may find somebody who
wants a yemayenkye tenant (Case 2-8). A casual laborer or a nhwesoo tenant
also typically tries to find better contracts (Case 2-9 and Case 2-10). The
preferred contract from the worker’s point of view is yemayenkye, in which, as
previously discussed, the tenant’s land right is stable and various other incen-
tives are embedded. Nhwesoo comes next, because a tenant has a right to grow
food crops. Other hired labor contracts such as task-contracted and daily-
wage labor are considered inferior to the two share contracts, but in any case
they provide important income opportunities for both landless and landhold-
ing villagers. Depending on their life cycle stage and socioeconomic back-
ground, villagers enter various contracts. In this way the two types of share
contracts provide important steps of promotion in a farmer’s career.
A similar link between contract choice and farmer life cycle can be ob-
served for landlords. In migrant cocoa-farming villages, such as the three
villages studied, farmers typically migrate from their hometowns when they
are young to establish cocoa farms in land-abundant forest areas (Middleton
1979; Hill 1963). While developing his career as a cocoa farmer in the village,
the migrant invests most of the profit from the farm(s) in educating his chil-
dren or in building houses in his hometown. When the farmer becomes old
and physically weak, he retires to his hometown. The two forms of share
contracts provide a convenient arrangement for such retired farmers. If the
retiring farmer has mature cocoa farms, he would enter a nhwesoo contract,
from which regular income after retirement is guaranteed. In this case, little
information asymmetry concerning farm conditions exists between the con-
tracting parties, because the retired farmer has accurate information on the
cocoa farms that were established and managed by him until retirement.
Therefore, although the retired farmer (the landlord) resides far away from the
farm, the tenant has little chance to underreport the total harvest. If the retiring
farmer has an old cocoa farm whose yield is declining, he may enter a
yemayenkye contract in which no labor input by the retiring farmer is re-
quired. In both cases the share contracts provide advantageous arrangements
for retiring farmers.
Besides their advantages for retiring farmers, the two contracts provide
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convenient arrangements for landlords who have various socioeconomic back-
grounds. For example, a farmer who has established an initial cocoa farm
through his own labor may want to establish a second farm. Faced with a labor
shortage, the farmer may choose to supplement his own labor with the labor of
a tenant, and hand over the management of the already-established farm to a
nhwesoo tenant. Similarly, an elderly woman who inherited cocoa farms from
her deceased husband but does not have the physical strength to work the
farms may also choose to enter a nhwesoo contract to acquire the necessary
labor. On the other hand, for an absentee landlord who either inherited or
purchased uncultivated land in the villages but has a full-time job in town,
yemayenkye is a likely choice because the landlord can establish new farms
with no input on his part. Thus the two types of share contracts provide
flexibility to landlords, enabling them to choose contracts appropriate to their
different socioeconomic situations.
3. Reasons for Adopting the Share Contract
In the study villages, the two types of share contracts discussed above are
the dominant forms of agrarian contracts in cocoa production. By contrast,
fixed-rent contracts or fixed-wage contracts are rarely found. The following
discussion examines why the share contract is preferred over the other two
tenancy contracts in Ghana’s cocoa production.
When a landlord and a tenant reside in the same or nearby villages, landlord
supervision of the tenant is strong and contract enforcement relatively easy.
This is the situation in which nhwesoo is practiced in Ghanaian cocoa produc-
tion. Given the low cost of monitoring labor in this situation, the contractual
form preferred by a landlord would be the fixed-wage contract in which the
landlord gain all the return on the increased inputs. On the other hand, the
worker/tenant would find the share contract far more advantageous because
the land usufruct right for food production is ensured. In addition, the risks
associated with cocoa production (such as weather, diseases, and price change)
can be shared between tenants and landlords in the share contract. The fixed-
rent contract will not be an option because the tenant must bear all the risks.
When the landlord and the tenant prefer different types of contracts as
stated above, the outcome of contract choice seems to be influenced by the
relative bargaining power of the two parties. Namely, when the landlord’s
bargaining power is relatively strong, the fixed-wage contract would be cho-
sen. Otherwise, the share contract would be adopted. A critical factor in
southern Ghana influencing the relative bargaining power of the two parties is
the shortage of farm labor and high labor mobility. Throughout the history of
cocoa production in Ghana, acquiring the necessary labor has been the major
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constraint, and migrant labor from northern Ghana and Burkina Faso has
played an important role in fulfilling this demand. In addition, the rural popu-
lation in Ghana is highly mobile because of its search for employment, both
rural and urban. These factors seems to indicate that hired workers have more
options in contract choice than the labor-demanding landlords, giving work-
ers/tenants a stronger bargaining position when specifying contracts.
In the study villages, the annual labor contract (a type of fixed-wage con-
tract) appears to be chosen only when the worker has weak bargaining power.
In the survey, only a few cases of annual labor were found, and the contract
rarely last more than a few years. Because daily necessities are provided,
arrangements for annual labor contracts is a good starting point for new
migrant laborers who have no experience in cocoa production and thus have
limited bargaining power vis-à-vis the landlords. Within a few years, however,
most annual laborers acquire work experiences in cocoa farming and knowl-
edge on local conditions, and enter other contractual arrangements more
favorable to them. This fact appears to indicate that the fixed-wage contract is
chosen only when the worker/tenant is in a relatively weak bargaining posi-
tion.
When a contract is made with an absentee landlord, as in the case of
yemayenkye, landlord supervision of tenant work is weak, and the landlord
has to bear the high cost of monitoring labor. In addition, reputation does not
play a significant role in providing work incentives to workers in Ghana, as
discussed above. Therefore the fixed-wage contract, in which workers have
little incentive to work hard, is not an option. In the case of fixed-rent con-
tracts paid in cash, the landlord again has to bear high transaction costs. This
is because, given the soaring domestic prices and frequent changes in the
cocoa producer price, the landlord has to bear great costs for collecting infor-
mation needed to decide annual rents and for concluding a contract with the
tenant each year. This problem of high transaction cost necessary for rent
decisions on the landlord side can be solved by adopting fixed-rent contract in
kind, because costs of collecting price information is unnecessary. However,
the fixed-rent contract imposes on the tenant the heavy burden of bearing all
the risks arising from changes in output. Thus, when the tenant’s bargaining
power is strong with many contract options as is the case in Ghana where
labor is short, and with the absentee landlord unable to use his land efficiently
without tenant labor, the fixed-rent contract, which is unfavorable to tenants,
is not likely to be adopted. In short, yemayenkye is adopted when there is (a) a
heavy cost burden on the landlord for supervision and enforcement, (b) a high
cost on the landlord for collecting information on changing prices and for
determining fixed-rent cash payments, and (c) relatively strong bargaining
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power on the tenant side, given the shortage of labor. Thus, the existence of
various transaction costs on the landlord side and the relatively stronger bar-
gaining power of tenants play important roles in the choice of share contracts
in Ghanaian cocoa production.
Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter has focused on various agrarian contracts in cocoa
production in Ghana. Section I categorized labor contracts and reviewed the
ways of obtaining usufruct right to land. Section II clarified the two types of
share contracts widely practiced in cocoa production. It indicated that the two
types of share contracts, nhwesoo and yemayenkye, provide both landlords
and tenants with various incentives that are often related to villagers’ life
cycles. By entering into either form of share contract, a tenant obtains access
to land for food crops. A yemayenkye tenant acquires a stable and inheritable
usufruct right to land, and may even have an opportunity to become a land-
holding farmer. When landlord supervision is weak, a tenant may underreport
the total harvest, enjoying a higher production incentive and, simultaneously,
a risk-sharing arrangement with the landlord. On the other hand, the two types
of share contract provide landlords with flexibility, allowing them to choose
contracts appropriate to their different socioeconomic situations. The section
also examined why the share contracts are preferred to the fixed-wage or
fixed-rent contracts in cocoa production. The analysis showed that various
transaction costs (such as costs for collecting information on price, for work
supervision and enforcement, and for negotiating rent agreements) and the
relative bargaining power between contracting parties are important factors
influencing contract choice.
Cases
Case 2-1: A Nhwesoo Contract
Ama, aged seventy, owns a cocoa farm in Bepoase inherited from her
deceased husband. The farm is managed by a nhwesoo tenant whose tasks are
the weeding, spraying, and harvesting the cocoa. The sharing arrangement of
the harvest is abusa (triplet division), in which Ama takes two parts. The
tenant occasionally employs hired labor to do the farm work, paying for this
himself. When spraying insecticide, Ama is responsible for buying chemicals
and hiring a machine. Ama often asks the tenant to work on her food farms,
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but this additional work is remunerated separately from the tenant’s work on
the cocoa farm. Ama also provides the tenant with a room to stay in.
Case 2-2: A Cocoa-Sharing Yemayenkye Contract
Kwabena is a male yemayenkye tenant in Gyaha who started his contract in
1957 with an absentee landlord. He and the landlord prepared a written agree-
ment of the contract in 1989. In this contract, according to the written agree-
ment: (a) the contracting parties divide the cocoa and oil palm harvests equally;
(b) food crops are divided into three parts, of which the tenant takes two; (c)
the tenant is prohibited from selling or pledging the farm; (d) the contract
ceases if the tenant steals the harvest; and (e) the land will be returned to the
landlord if all the trees on the farm die. According to Kwabena, in spite of (b)
above, he can dispose of all food crops harvested from the farm. In addition,
he asserts that he and the landlord have agreed to divide the farm into two
equal parts in the future, although no written agreement has been prepared on
this.
Case 2-3: A Tree-Dividing Yemayenkye Contract
Boateng, aged sixty, is a male yemayenkye tenant who started his contract
in 1977. He and his landlord prepared a written agreement of the contract
which says that: (a) cocoa trees on the farm will be divided into two equal
parts and shared by the contracting parties; (b) land will remain as a “bona fide
property” of the landlord even after dividing the trees; (c) the contracting
parties share the maize produced on the farm on a fifty-fifty basis, but other
food crops are for the tenant; (d) valuable trees on the farm such as mahogany
should not be cut down without the consent of the landlord; (e) the landlord
can cancel the contract if the tenant abandons the farm or steals the harvest;
and (f) if the cocoa farm is in good condition, the tenant’s successor can
inherit the use-right to the land.
Case 2-4: A Land-Dividing Yemayenkye Contract
Ben and his brother Kwesi together started a yemayenkye contract as ten-
ants in 1979 in Gyaha. After completing the establishment of the cocoa farm,
the landlord agreed in 1996 to divide the land into two equal parts, of which
Ben and Kwesi jointly took one part. Ben and Kwesi further divided their part
of the land into two equal parts, each taking one part. On dividing the land,
they prepared a written agreement with the landlord which says that the kin
members of the original landlord have no right to claim the part of the land
which is now the “bona fide property” of Ben and Kwesi, and this also applies
even if all the cocoa trees die in the future.
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Case 2-5: Ambiguity of Yemayenkye Contract
Kwabena, aged forty-five, is a yemayenkye tenant who started establishing
a cocoa farm in 1977 and now divides the cocoa harvest into two equal parts
with his landlord. Kwabena told the present writer that the landlord agreed to
divide the land in the future. In a separate interview with the landlord, how-
ever, the landlord insisted that the contract is for dividing only cocoa and that
he has no intention to divide the land with Kwabena. They prepared no written
agreement of the contract.
Case 2-6: A Cultivating-Landlord Who Is Also a Tenant
Kwame, aged seventy-six, was one of the first settlers in Bepoase and is
now a prominent cocoa farmer in the village. He owns six cocoa farms and
manages three of them himself. Two of the other farms are managed by
nhwesoo tenants, and the remaining one by a yemayenkye tenant. Besides
these farms he leases in land and is establishing a new cocoa farm under a
yemayenkye arrangement. Thus, he is simultaneously a landlord, an own-
account farmer, and a tenant.
Case 2-7: Inheritance of Usufruct Right under Yemayenkye Contract
Owusu, aged fifty-five, is a yemayenkye tenant in Gyaha. The contract was
started by his elder brother who died in 1993. Owusu inherited the contract
and is now managing the cocoa farm established by the deceased brother.
Owusu also allocated the remaining uncultivated land to the children of the
deceased. In this way eight people are now working under the single
yemayenkye contract, with Owusu playing a coordinating role.
Case 2-8: From an Annual Laborer to a Landholding Farmer
Amadu, aged fifty-two, was born in northern Ghana and migrated to Nagore
in 1958 as a farm laborer. During the first six years he worked as an annual
laborer and then entered a yemayenkye contract. In 1966 he purchased a parcel
of land from a local chief using the money he had saved during the first six
years in Nagore. In addition, after twelve years of yemayenkye, he and his
landlord divided the land into two equal parts. Thus, a one-time landless
migrant laborer is now an own-account farmer with two parcels of land.
Case 2-9: Yemayenkye and an Opportunity to Become a Landholding Farmer
Sammuel was twenty-one years old when he came to Nagore in 1995 as a
seasonal hired laborer. During the first seven months he engaged in daily-
wage and task-contracted labor but soon found a landlord looking for a
yemayenkye tenant. In 1996 he entered a land-dividing yemayenkye contract
with the landlord and prepared a written agreement. According to the agree-
ment: (a) the tenant has to complete the establishment of a new cocoa farm
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within six years; (b) after completion the tenant is entitled to all cocoa har-
vests for the subsequent five years; (c) the tenant sprays the farm three times a
year, but the cost of purchasing insecticide is borne by the landlord; and (d) in
the eleventh year after the commencement of the contract, the tenant and
landlord will divide the land into two equal parts.
Case 2-10: From a Nhwesoo Tenant to a Yemayenkye Tenant
Patrick, aged thirty-five, got married in 1991 and now has two children.
After his marriage he stopped several nhwesoo contracts he had been doing,
and started three yemayenkye contracts with different landlords. The present
writer asked him why he stopped nhwesoo and started new yemayenkye con-
tracts. His answer was that because he is now married and has a wife and
children, he wants to leave some property (agyapade) to them. He further
explained that, although the nhwesoo he did previously was profitable, the
cocoa farm under nhwesoo cannot be inherited by his children. On the other
hand, the cocoa farm he is now establishing under yemayenkye is an inherit-
able property as long as the farm is in good condition.
Notes
1 Robertson (1982) and Boadu (1992) analyzed share contracts in Ghanaian cocoa
production based on the situation in the cocoa-producing villages prior to the
1960s. Hayami and Otsuka (1993) undertook a general economic analysis of
share contracts.
2 Some villagers call the two forms of share contracts differently. Nhwesoo is
sometimes referred to as abusa, and yemayenkye as abunu in Bepoase. This
reflects the fact that the sharing arrangements of nhwesoo are usually triplet
division (abusa), and those of yemayenkye are half division (abunu). Some Fante
residents in Gyaha refer to nhwesoo as abehyem (etymology unknown).
3 Among those who are fifteen years old or over in the study villages, 74 per cent in
Bepoase, 90 per cent in Nagore, and 91 per cent in Gyaha were born outside the
villages.
4 However, as the table includes many distant relationships, not all the cases are
indicative of future gifting or inheritance.
